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1 Introduction
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a way to bring public projects and programs under public
scrutiny is a feature of good governance which most economists agree on. CBA is applied
not only to individual small projects but also to public programs that influence the
economy as a whole as, for example, the Stern Review on climate change (2006) has
recently illustrated. Such a cost-benefit analysis with economy-wide costs and benefits
requires an integrated assessment of how to best allocate the overall resources between
public and private uses. Based on the notion of opportunity cost, the integrated CBA
stipulates resource allocations where public investments earn the same, potentially risk-
corrected, return as private investments (e.g., Nordhaus 2007). In this paper, we show
that there is no basis for such a stand-alone return requirement when we depart from the
idealized setting of time-consistent preferences. Even when all present and future agents
could commit to equalize comparable returns on public and private uses of savings,
the rule would have no welfare content: it implements Pareto efficiency if and only if
preferences are time-consistent. Efficiency requires rules not only for the composition of
savings between public and private uses but also for the overall savings. Without these,
the economy is better off by ignoring the stand-alone cost-benefit requirement for public
investments.
The long-term public choices we have in mind are those related to long-term energy-
supply, city planning, education, and environmental preservation, which have implica-
tions for the course of the economy over time, and where it seems to be a fact of life
that the future rankings over the decisions are different from those prevailing at the time
of decision making. We consider the allocation of savings for such uses when the future
rankings over alternatives are a priori known to be different, due to dynamic inconsisten-
cies. Such dynamic inconsistencies can arise from time-variant preferences (Strotz, 1956),
intergenerational altruism (Phelps and Pollak, 1968), or self-control problems (Laibson,
1997).1 In climate change, there is an emerging consensus that the far-distant gains
from policies may not be appropriately captured by the cost-benefit calculations based
on private capital opportunity costs but, rather, the future benefits should be converted
to present values at discount rates declining with the time horizon; however, declining
1Non-constant discount rates can also result from aggregation over heterogenous individuals (Gollier
and Zeckhauser, 2005, Lengwiler, 2005), or from uncertainty (Weitzman, 2000, Gollier, 2002). These
need not to cause time-inconsistencies in the preference structure. We come back to this question in the
concluding section.
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discount rates introduce inconsistencies into climate policies (Karp 2005).2
Casting the analysis in the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson framework, we show that there is
more investment in the long-term public asset in the benchmark equilibrium than under
the equilibrium where the cost-benefit requirement is institutionalized, i.e., exogenous.
Intuitively, the long-term asset provides commitment to a higher welfare for the far-
future generations at the cost of the intermediate-future generations, which is an option
valued by the current generation. The current decision-maker accepts the costs of this
commitment, i.e., a lower than market rate of return for the long-term asset, and would
strictly suffer from imposing the cost-benefit rule, even if such a rule is also followed by all
later generations. While Pareto efficiency implies the cost-benefit rule — also in our case
of time-inconsistent preferences — the inverse does not hold: neither efficiency nor Pareto
improvement can be obtained just by insisting CBA as part of the “executive branch”.
As we will show, a fully efficient policy requires that the cost-benefit rule is supplemented
with other policy measures, and without these, CBA unambiguously decreases welfare.3
To analyze the cost-benefit rule in a closed economy, we consider a representative-
agent Ramsey saving problem where savings are allocated between traditional neoclassical
capital and long-term public assets. The former capital can be interpreted as resulting
from the aggregation of individual decisions and is thus private by nature, while the latter
type of capital is public by assumption. We abstract from the aggregation and political
economy aspects of the public decisions in order to pinpoint the allocative distortions not
solved by CBA even in the representative agent framework. In this closed economy, the
capital stock produces endogenously the rate-of-return requirement, or the opportunity
cost, of the public investments; such an approach is needed, for example, in the climate
context where the policy has an effect on the growth path of the economy (see, e.g.,
Weitzman 2007 and Nordhaus 2007).
For the welfare consequences of CBA, we consider welfare Pareto Efficiency (w-PE),
where at each point in time welfare depends on both current and future utility levels. In
principle, welfare for a given generation can look backwards and forwards in time, i.e.,
depend also on the utility levels in the past (in a different setting, Caplin and Leahy (2004)
consider such a w-PE). In addition to the standard welfare Pareto efficiency criterion,
2The Stern Review on climate change (2006) has illustrated the potential scope and complexity of
CBA. From the discussion that followed the Stern Review, it is clear that weights attributed to far-future
payoffs strongly divide economists (see the September 2007 issue in the Journal of Economic Literature).
3Arrow et al. (1996) list eight principles for applying CBA, and, consistent with us, also conclude
that cost-benefit rules do not automatically imply good policy.
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we employ an auxiliary concept of utility Pareto Efficiency (u-PE), corresponding to
the maximization of an intertemporal stream of weighted utilities where weights can
be interpreted as discount factors. The hyperbolic discounting models popularized by
Laibson (1997), and also O’Donough and Rabin (1999), and Barro (1999) satisfy the
u-PE criterion: the equilibrium path of these models maximize a utility stream for some
sequence of utility weights. It is clear that u-PE is a weaker efficiency concept, and it is
well understood that w-PE implies u-PE but the implication does not hold in the other
direction.4
This conceptualization helps us to connect to the previous literature and to define
the connection between cost-benefit rules, inconsistent preferences, and welfare sharply.
First, without the cost-benefit requirement the equilibrium outcome in our model is not
even u-PE, i.e., the multiple-asset model shows a distortion not present in popular one
capital-good hyperbolic discounting models. Second, adding the cost-benefit requirement
as an institutional constraint will restore u-PE. But, if preferences are inconsistent, wel-
fare Pareto efficiency never follows from u-PE and, in addition, the cost-benefit rule is
not even Pareto improving. Insisting on such rules thus leads to the satisfaction of a
narrow efficiency concept (u-PE), but the wider concept of welfare efficiency (w-PE) is
not generally satisfied.
We first present a simple three-period example to illustrate the main results. The
framework easily extends to the infinite number of periods, although the equilibrium
analysis requires restrictions not present in three periods (see also Krusell et al. 2002,
and Karp 2005, and 2007). We seek to formulate the general model such that we can flex-
ibly analyze the relative persistence of the public asset because the persistence is the key
determinant of the degree of commitment that the asset provides to the inconsistent de-
cision maker. For a certain degree of persistence, there is no incentive to deviate from the
cost-benefit rule, and the resulting equilibrium is observationally equivalent to a consis-
tent preferences equilibrium, even though the underlying preferences are inconsistent, as
in Barro (1999). The observational equivalence does not hold generally, however. More-
over, the deviation from the cost-benefit rule (i.e., under- or over-investment) depends
both on the persistence parameters and the nature of preference inconsistency.
4Our welfare Pareto efficiency is a version of the multi-self Pareto efficiency; see Bernheim and Rangel
(2009) for a discussion of the standard definition and suggestion for an alternative concept. Their
definition of a weak welfare optimum in Corollary 2 is more restrictive than our w-PE, and requires that
the subsequent choices are made by the same identity. Our model allows for an altruistic interpretation
as in Phelps and Pollak (1968) with multiple generations.
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2 A three-period model
2.1 The setting
We first consider three generations, living in periods t = 1, 2, 3. In each period, con-
sumers are represented by an aggregate agent having a utility function and production
technology. Consumption programs (c, q) = (c1, c2, c3, q) ∈ A = A1×A2×A3×Aq (non-
empty intervals) constitute of a consumption level for each generation and the final asset
q to the last generation. Generations are assumed to have the following simple welfare
representation
w1 = u1(c1) + ρ[u2(c2) + θ[u3(c3) + v(q)]] (1)
w2 = u2(c2) + σ[u3(c3) + v(q)] (2)
w3 = u3(c3) + v(q), (3)
where all utility functions ut and v are assumed to be continuous and, in addition,
strictly concave, differentiable, and satisfying limc→0 u′t = ∞ and limq→0 v′ = ∞. For
interpretation, we assume that parameters ρ, θ, σ ∈ [0, 1] are discount factors, although
this is not necessary in this three period model. Inconsistent preferences are identified by
θ 6= σ, i.e., the first and second generations disagree on the relative weight given to the
last generation’s utility. When θ > σ = ρ, the near future is discounted more than the
far future. Following Phelps and Pollak (1968) or, e.g., Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005)
this can be interpreted as pure altruism towards the last generation, or alternatively as
lack of (governmental) self control (Laibson, 1997).5 For completeness, we also allow for
the case θ < σ. This could represent a situation where the representative agent looks
one period ahead with less interest in the future further away.
Generations consider choices in a convex consumption possibility set A ⊆ R4+. The
consumption possibilities are determined by a strictly concave neoclassical production
function ft(kt), where kt is the capital stock they receive from the previous generation.
The first generation starts with a capital stock k1, and produces output which can be
used to consume c1, to invest in capital for the immediate next period k2, or to invest in
5We can obtain the common β, δ model as in Phelps-Pollak-Laibson if ρ = σ, by defining β = ρ/θ
and δ = θ. Then, w1 = u1 +βδu2 +βδ
2u3 and w2 = u2 +βδu3. Inconsistencies are indentified by β < 1,
corresponding to θ > σ in our case. For our purposes, it is slightly more straightforward to name the
long-run weights as θ and σ. The short-run weight ρ gives degree of freedom in terms of interpretations
(as just illustrated) but is inconsequential for the consistency of the preferences.
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a durable asset for the third period, q:
c1 + k2 + q = f1(k1). (4)
The second agent starts with the capital stock k2, which produces output f2(k2), and can
use its income to consume c2, or to invest in capital for the third period k3:
c2 + k3 = f2(k2). (5)
In this simple example, we abstract from possibilities of the second consumer to invest
in the durable asset q. The third consumer derives utility from its consumption,
c3 = f3(k3), (6)
and from the inherited durable asset v(q).
2.2 Welfare and utility Pareto efficiency
Consider an allocation (c, q) that is Pareto efficient for welfare levels (w∗1, w
∗
2, w
∗
3) defined
in (1)-(3). If we maximize w1, subject to the constraints w2 ≥ w∗2, and w3 ≥ w∗3 and
feasibility constraints (4)-(6), then we must find the same allocation, and non-negative
Lagrange multipliers (α, β) ∈ R2+ for the welfare constraints. That is, the Pareto efficient
allocation is also the solution of a welfare program maximizing
W (c, q) = w1 + αw2 + βw3 (7)
= u1(c1) + (ρ+ α)u2(c2) + (ρθ + ασ + β)[u3(c3) + v(q)] (8)
subject to (4)-(6). The conclusion also holds the other way around: any solution to a
welfare maximization program with some (α, β) ∈ R2+ is Pareto efficient. Strict concavity
of the production functions and utility functions ensures the uniqueness of the allocation.
Therefore, we can associate any Pareto efficient allocation with a pair of positive welfare
weights (α, β) ∈ R2+.6 7
An alternative, and often easier, approach to describing efficiency is to directly con-
sider the weighted stream of utilities. We say that a feasible allocation (u∗1, u
∗
2, u
∗
3) is
utility Pareto efficient (u-PE) if no utility level can strictly increase while keeping all
6We rule out allocations where the weight on w1 equals zero. The weight on w1 approaches zero, in
relative terms, when at least one of the other weights becomes sufficiently large.
7Note that here the welfare is determined in a forward-looking manner but we could also define
backward-looking welfare weights as in Caplin and Leahy (2004).
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other utility levels at least constant. To separate the auxiliary concept of u-PE from the
true Pareto efficiency we call the latter welfare Pareto efficiency (w-PE). Similar to the
approach above, it is easy to see that a feasible allocation is u-PE if and only if there
exist utility weights (α′, β′) ∈ R2+ such that the allocation maximizes U(c, q) for these
weights, where
U(c, q) = u1(c1) + α
′u2(c2) + β
′[u3(c3) + v(q)]. (9)
Note that W (c, q) and U(c, q) are not independent welfare functions but rather tools
for describing all feasible w-PE and u-PE allocations. Our purpose is to use the concept of
utility weights and their connection to welfare weights for verifying whether equilibrium
allocations considered below are efficient. The utility weights implied by an equilibrium
allocation are easy to infer; see, e.g., Barro (1999) and Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005).
If these weights are negative, we can immediately conclude that the allocation cannot be
Pareto efficient. Even when the implied utility weights are positive, the welfare weights
can be negative and thus the allocation is off the Pareto frontier. Whereas every pair of
non-negative welfare weights (α, β) ∈ R2+ can be converted into a pair of non-negative
utility weights (α′, β′) ∈ R2+, the inverse conversion is not immediate:
Remark 1 u-PE implies w-PE if and only if
α′ ≥ ρ (10)
β′ ≥ ρθ + (α′ − ρ)σ. (11)
It is clear that if the stated inequalities hold, there are positive weights (α, β) corre-
sponding to (α′, β′), and respecting the original preference structure (1)-(3). The “only
if” part follows from the observation that if one of the inequalities is not met, then one
of the implied welfare weights α or β must be negative. Intuitively, efficiency defined in
terms of utilities is consistent with welfare efficiency only if the weights on future utilities
are sufficiently large so future generations receive a welfare weight in addition to the
weight they receive indirectly from previous generations, e.g., due to altruism.
If u-PE is established, the gross savings levels q + k2 and k3 implicitly determine the
utility weights α′ and β′. The remark thereby implies that if u-PE is complemented
with a gross savings policy that secures sufficiently high utility weights for future agents,
welfare efficiency w-PE is guaranteed. In the remainder, we study the application of
the cost-benefit rule per se, without complementary savings rules, and ask whether the
cost-benefit rule suffices to establish welfare efficiency.
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2.3 Efficiency and the cost-benefit rule
We describe now how the cost-benefit rule follows from Pareto efficiency. Welfare Pareto
efficiency implies utility Pareto efficiency, as we can write α′ = ρ + α > 0 and β′ =
ρθ + ασ + β > 0 for positive welfare weights α and β, and therefore for convenience of
notation we use the utility maximization program (9) in this section. The first-order
conditions for {k2, k3, c1, c2, c3} tell us that any Pareto efficient allocation satisfies:
1 = [
α′u′2
u′1
]f ′2 = [
β′u′3
u′1
]f ′2f
′
3. (12)
Denote by MRSi,j > 0 the marginal-rate of substitution of consumptions between pe-
riods (i, j) (defined to be positive). Let Ri,j denote the (compound) rate of return on
capital from period i to j. We can then re-express the first-order conditions as the usual
consumption-based asset pricing equation:
1 =
R1,2
MRS1,2
=
R1,3
MRS1,3
. (13)
Thus, the marginal rate of substitution equals the return on savings. For the investment
in the public asset q to the last generation, the first-order condition requires u′1 = β
′v′,
which we rewrite as
1 = MRS1,q (14)
where MRS1,q is defined between period 1 consumption and q. To count for the oppor-
tunity cost of transferring period 1 output to the asset q, combine MRSq,3 = MRSq,1 ·
MRS1,3 and MRS1,3 = R1,3 yielding:
1 =
R1,3
MRSq,3
. (15)
This is the consumption-based cost-benefit rule. The benefit of one unit of investment in
the long-term asset q is measured in terms of the third-period consumption good. This
return to direct long-term investments should equal the opportunity cost determined
by the compound return on capital k. Under efficiency, the long-term asset q should
yield the same return as the capital asset k. Noticeably, the cost-benefit rule is neutral
with respect to, that is, independent of, weights given to each generation’s utility. The
cost-benefit rule is a positive, and sufficient test for utility efficiency:
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Lemma 1 Utility Pareto efficiency (u-PE) and the cost-benefit rule are equivalent: a
feasible allocation with strictly positive consumption, capital and public investment is
u-PE if and only if it satisfies the cost-benefit rule.
Proof. Necessity of the cost-benefit rule has been established above. To prove
sufficiency, we notice that given the allocation, we can construct the weights α′ and β′
from (12). It is straightforward to see that we can construct three non-negative Lagrange
multipliers for (4)-(6) to satisfy all first-order conditions for {k2, k3, c1, c2, c3}. The cost-
benefit rule then ensures that the first-order condition for q is also satisfied.
The equivalence will be instrumental in our equilibrium analysis. First, if the cost-
benefit rule is not satisfied, the equilibrium allocation is not u-PE let alone w-PE. We
find in the next section that in equilibrium the cost-benefit rule will not hold, so the
conclusion for efficiency is immediate. Then, in the following section, we impose the
cost-benefit rule as an institutional constraint on the equilibrium. We show that such
an equilibrium implies positive utility weights and thus restores u-PE, but the implied
welfare weights are not all positive unless preferences are consistent.
2.4 Equilibrium
Consider now the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game where generations
choose consumptions and investments in the order of their appearance in the time line,
given the preference structure (1)-(3).
The third agent consumes all capital received and enjoys the long-term asset. The
second agent decides on the capital k3 transferred to the third agent, given the long-
term asset q chosen by the first agent and the capital inherited k2. We thus have a
policy function k3 = g(k2, q), but for the separable utility specification, second-period
investments only depends on the stock of capital received, k3 = g(k2). The policy function
g ensures that the following first-order condition is maintained
1 =
σu′3
u′2
f ′3. (16)
The strict concavity of utility implies consumption smoothing, and thus if the second
agent inherits marginally more capital k2, the resulting increase in output is not saved
fully but rather split between the second and third generation:
Lemma 2 Policy function g satisfies 0 < g′ < R1,2.
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Proof. Substitute the policy function k3 = g(k2) in (16),
σu′3(f3(g(k2)))f
′
3(g(k2)) = u
′
2(f2(k2)− g(k2))
and take the full derivatives with respect to k2 to obtain
σg′(u′′3f
′
3f
′
3 + u
′
3f
′′
3 ) = u
′′
2(f
′
2 − g′)
which leads to
g′ =
f ′2u
′′
2
σu′′3f
′
3f
′
3 + σu
′
3f
′′
3 + u
′′
2
< f ′2 = R1,2 (17)
as u′′t , f
′′
t < 0 and f
′
t , u
′
t > 0.
The first agent decides on consumption and investment in the long-term asset, given
the policy function g, to maximize its welfare
w1 = u1 + ρ[u2(f2(k2)− g(k2)) + θu3(f3(g(k2)) + θv3(q)].
The first-order conditions for investments k2 and q, respectively, are:
u′1 = ρ(f
′
2 − g′)u′2 + ρθf ′3g′u′3 (18)
u′1 = ρθv
′. (19)
The equations reflect the fact that the marginal cost of investment, i.e., the marginal
utility loss, is the same for both types of investments. Rewriting after substitution of
(16) gives8
MRSq,3 = [
σ
θ
(f ′2 − g′) + g′]f ′3. (20)
This condition is the equilibrium version of the cost-benefit rule (15). To assess the
deviation from the rule (15), consider the difference between the equilibrium market
return on capital and the public asset. In view of (20), the gap R1,3 −MRSq,3 can be
written as
f ′2f
′
3 − [
σ
θ
(f ′2 − g′) + g′]f ′3 = (1−
σ
θ
)(f ′2 − g′)f ′3.
This together with Lemma 2 implies
R1,3 −MRSq,3 > 0 if and only if σ
θ
< 1. (21)
Thus, in equilibrium, the first agent invests in the long-term asset q up to a point
where the rate of return falls short of the rate of return of capital over the same period,
8Note that the marginal-rate of substitution between q and c3 is independent of weights on utilities,
and therefore there is no need to indicate who’s preferences are in question.
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if and only if the preferences are near-biased or hyperbolic, σ < θ, i.e., the first agent
gives a higher weight to the long-term utility than the second agent. The result has a
very simple intuition. The first consumer would like to distort investment in favor of the
third consumer, compared with the investment pattern of the second consumer. This is
possible through the asset q, and thus the long-term asset is more valuable to the first
agent, which is reflected in the lower return requirement. The opposite distortion —too
little investment— occurs if σ > θ.
Proposition 1 If preferences are inconsistent (σ 6= θ), the public investment in the long-
term asset does not satisfy the cost benefit rule, i.e., MRSq,3 6= R1,3. The equilibrium
return falls short of R1,3 iff σ < θ.
Proof. Above.
Considering the welfare properties of the equilibrium, it is clear from Lemma 1 that
if σ 6= θ, the equilibrium allocation is not welfare Pareto efficient as it is not even utility
Pareto efficient: we have shown that an efficient allocation must satisfy the cost-benefit
rule (15). Since the equilibrium deviates from this rule, we cannot find positive utility
weights that would support the equilibrium outcome as a u-PE outcome. Let us now
consider if efficiency can be restored by a cost-benefit requirement.
2.5 Cost-benefit law equilibrium
A simple suggestion for alleviating the efficiency loss due to the deviation from the cost-
benefit rule is an intertemporal cost-benefit law requiring that all public investments
should earn the same return as the opportunity cost determined by private investments.
We impose such a restriction as an institutional constraint on the equilibrium behavior
— it can be thought of as a budget office scrutinizing the investment plan at the end of
each period. The budget office has no preferences, and it simply enforces the cost-benefit
requirement, without restricting the choices of each generation in any other way.
In three periods, the law will constrain only the first generation’s choices for con-
sumption and investments in the two purposes. Given the policy function g of the second
generation, the first generation maximizes
w1 = u1 + ρ[u2(f2(k2)− g(k2)) + θu3(f3(g(k2)) + θv3(q3)]
subject to the budget equation and the cost-benefit requirement
MRSq,3 = R1,3.
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While the consumption-based cost-benefit rule (CBR) implies a complicated-looking
constraint on the current actions, there is a simple way to model it. Note that the CBR is
reducing the first generation’s control of the equilibrium allocation: it can only decide on
the total savings as the cost-benefit rule determines the allocation of the savings among
the two assets. Let I denote the total savings by generation 1. Now, when facing savings
I the budget office needs the imputed equilibrium returns on the two assets in order to
allocate the savings among the two assets such that the CBR is satisfied. The imputed
returns depend on generation 2 policy function, so the budget office needs to solve the
generation 2 problem to fulfill its task of allocating savings for the two purposes. But
as the second generation has no time-inconsistency problem, it therefore cannot gain by
deviating from the cost-benefit rule. The budget office’s task and the second generation’s
preferences thus run parallel, and we can interpret the equilibrium as one where the
budget office at the end of period 1 and the second generation are joined.
Given that the budget office is known to behave this way, we may then solve the
equilibrium behavior under the following budget sets:
c1 + I = f1(k1) (22)
c2 + k3 = f2(I − q) (23)
c3 = f3(k3), (24)
where I indicates the overall saving of generation 1, q is the public investment that
the second generation sets apart for the third generation, and k3 is the capital stock
transferred to generation 3. Note that this change in the timing of the decision on public
investment q leaves the production possibility set of the economy unaltered.
The second generation finds the optimal investments portfolio in the two stocks k2
and q under budget constraints (23)-(24) and given wealth from the previous generation
I by solving
max
k3,q
u2(c2) + σ[u3(c3) + v(q)], (25)
leading to equilibrium conditions
u′2 = σu
′
3f
′
3 (26)
u′2f
′
2 = σv
′, (27)
and thus
v′
u′3
= MRSq,3 = R1,3 = f
′
2f
′
3.
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We see therefore immediately that the cost-benefit rule will be satisfied, irrespective of
the wealth transfer I from generation 1. This is no surprise since, as pointed out above,
generation 2 has no time-inconsistency problem.
While the CBR restores the “productive efficiency” in the public investment, the first
generation can still decide on transfer I following its own preferences. It is therefore not
clear whether the CBR restores efficiency in terms of welfare. To explore this, consider
conditions (26)-(27) defining generation 2 policy functions g(I) and h(I) for capital k3
and public investment q, respectively.9 Using the policies, we can write the continuation
value for generation 1 as
V2(I) = u2(f2(I − h(I))− g(I)) + θu3(f3(g(I))) + θv(h(I))
to obtain the return for investment I as
V ′2(I) = [(1− h′)− g′]f ′2u′2 + θf ′3g′u′3 + θh′v′
= [1 + (
θ
σ
− 1)(h′ + g′)]f ′2u′2,
where the latter line follows from using (26)-(27). Note that h′ > 0 and g′ > 0. The first
generation balances costs and benefits of the transfer by choosing I to satisfy
u′1(f1(k1)− I) = ρV ′2(I),
implying
α′ =
u′1
u′2f
′
2
= ρ[1 + (
θ
σ
− 1)(h′ + g′)] ≥ 0. (28)
The equilibrium thus puts this implicit value for the utility weight α′ in the program
that maximizes the utility-weighted value U(c, q) = u1(c1) + α
′u2(c2) + β
′[u3(c3) + v(q)].
Similarly, we have
β′
α′
=
u′2
u′3f
′
3
= σ (29)
so that the implied β′ is
β′ = σρ[1 + (
θ
σ
− 1)(h′ + g′)] ≥ 0. (30)
We can now state the welfare consequences of the cost-benefit requirement.
Proposition 2 The welfare implications of the CBR:
9By the assumptions made on the primitives of the model, the policy function are continuous, in-
creasing, and differentiable.
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1. The cost-benefit rule implements utility Pareto efficiency (u-PE) for θ 6= σ and
θ = σ.
2. The cost-benefit rule implements welfare Pareto efficiency (w-PE) iff θ = σ.
Proof. We have seen in Lemma 1 that the CBR and the concept of u-PE are equiva-
lent. Above we constructed the allocation satisfying the cost-benefit rule, and derived the
implied non-negative weights (α′, β′), without any restrictions on the discount factors.
This proves the first item. For the second item, we show that inequalities in Remark
1 can hold if and only if θ = σ. Thus, only for consistent preferences are the implied
welfare weights non-negative. For inequality (10), note that
α′ = ρ[1 + (
θ
σ
− 1)(h′ + g′)] ≥ ρ⇔ θ ≥ σ. (31)
For inequality (11), substitute (29) and write
β′ = σα′ ≥ ρθ + (α′ − ρ)σ,
which simplifies to
σ ≥ θ (32)
We see that (10) and (11) are in contradiction unless θ = σ, a case in which equalities
hold in (31) and (32). If θ > σ, then (31) and thus (10) is satisfied but (32) violated. If
θ < σ, then by (31) condition (10) is violated.
It is worth emphasizing why the CBR equilibrium violates Pareto efficiency. When
θ > σ, the CBR equilibrium implies that the welfare weight on the last generation is
negative, β < 0. This is intuitive as the first generation would like to transfer more
wealth to the last generation but cannot do so due to the CBR. The fact that the first
generation is prevented from implementing its altruistic plan for the future distorts the
overall savings below the minimum level that supports Pareto efficiency. On the other
hand, if θ < σ, the implied weight on the middle generation is negative, α < 0.
Corollary 1 The CBR does not imply a welfare Pareto improvement vis-a-vis the equi-
librium without the cost-benefit law.
The reason for this result is simple: the cost-benefit law is only a constraint on the
first generation, as it could have implemented such a law without consulting the later
generations. Therefore, enforcing the CBR must decrease welfare of the first generation
if θ 6= σ. If preferences are time-consistent, the CBR does not change equilibrium. In
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three periods, generation 1 cannot benefit from the later generations adherence to the
CBR.
Though the results above clearly establish inefficiency of the cost-benefit rule, we
stress that it is not possible to observe ex-post violation of Pareto efficiency, since the
equilibrium is observationally equivalent to an equilibrium following from time-consistent
preferences:
Corollary 2 The inefficient CBR equilibrium is observationally equivalent to a w-PE
equilibrium associated with time consistent preferences
The corolloary directly follows from the construction of such an alternative time
preference: consider ρ˜ = α′, θ˜ = σ˜ = σ, and (28) and (29) then show the equivalence.
The assumption in the three-period model that investments in q can be used to
directly transfer welfare from the first to the last generation is a strong one. To assess
the potential welfare gains from the CBR in a context with more flexible intertemporal
substitution, we consider next if such benefits can exist in an infinite-horizon setting with
continual subsequent investments in the public assets.
2.6 Discussion
The main lessons will carry over to the more general model, so we may discuss some
policy implications after this preliminary analysis. It should first be emphasized what
is not implied by the analysis: we do not want to implicate that fully efficient policies
should not satisfy the cost-benefit rule. The cost-benefit requirement is a simple policy
rule to advocate and something that could potential arise as an “intergenerational so-
cial contract” regarding the good public governance. We have demonstrated only that
the cost benefit rule, when it dictates the allocation of current resources among alter-
native uses, cannot internalize all inefficiencies, if the overall amount of resources left
for the future is open to choice. The core of the welfare inefficiency is that the first
generation cannot directly transfer income to any but the immediately next future gen-
eration. The cost benefit rule prevents the use of public assets for altruistic purposes,
which then reduces the overall savings, thereby adding to the existing intergenerational
welfare-transfer distortion. This key problem of the cost-benefit rule has already been
discussed by Lind (1995), but qualitatively. In order to benefit all parties the cost benefit
requirement should be accompanied by policy rules steering the savings rate. While we
do have various “golden rules” for the public sector finances, the macro-economic savings
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decisions are inherently private, and the structure of time preferences cannot be derived
from savings observations as noted by Barro (1999). Our analysis, stated in Corollary
2, extends this result and shows that if all investments have to satisfy the cost-benefit
requirement, then underlying preferences cannot be derived from the savings decisions.
It is thus less clear if anything as easy to interpret as a rule as the cost-benefit check can
be devised for savings.
We do not provide an explicit political economy justification for the time-inconsistencies,
but it is useful to contrast our findings with the central questions in political economy
where we often see that various restrictions on the set of policies that democratically
elected governments can implement are viewed as welfare-improving. An example is the
European Union public deficit restrictions as stated in the Maastricht Treaty. The polit-
ical economy literature provides various arguments for restrictions on policies that would
otherwise be used, through some persistent fundamentals of the economy, to influence
future outcomes. For example, Persson and Svensson (1989) show that without insti-
tutional constraints, time-inconsistent preferences will press the current government to
exert control over its successors behavior by running deficits.10 Tabellini and Alessina
(1990) argue that the lack of current majority’s control over future voters most-preferred
composition of spending tends to create current deficits, as a solution to the commit-
ment problem. More directly related to our setting, Glazer (1987) finds that uncertainty
of future voting outcomes biases current public investment towards durable long-term
physical capital, and, more normatively, Bassetti and Sargent (2006) argue in favor of
the golden rule where physical long-term public investments should be exempted from
deficit restrictions.
Our results share the positive tone of this literature, as the current investments –in
the absence of cost-benefit rules– are used to tie the hands of the future agents. However,
on the normative side, we argue against simple behavioral rules eliminating discretion by
the current decision maker as not welfare enhancing. The normative conclusion we reach
is that such rules must be part of a larger package that not only corrects for distortions
in the composition of temporal spending but also in the intertemporal choices. Thus,
while reasons differ, we concur with Tabellini and Alessina (1990): “There is a role
for institutions that enable society to separate its intertemporal choices from decisions
concerning the allocation of resources within any given period”.
10Interestingly, Fiva and Natvik (2010) find evidence using data from Norwegian municipalities that
public investments are stimulated by higher continuation probabilities for the current majority.
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3 Infinite horizon model
3.1 The setting
The more general framework, introduced in this section, allows us to flexibly analyze
the relative persistence of the commitment provided by the public asset, and also the
welfare implications of the cost-benefit law when it influences not only the current public
investments but also the future ones. This section on the infinite-horizon model proceeds,
after introducing the setting, by first developing the conceptual tools for welfare analysis,
i.e., the infinite-horizon versions of the utility (u-PE) and welfare Pareto efficiency (w-
PE). The main plot has already been outlined: we infer the utility weights from the
equilibrium outcome, and their implications for the welfare weights. We obtain the same
results as in three periods but the infinite horizon setting allows addressing a richer set of
questions. For example, the relative persistence of the public asset determines the over-
or under-investments together with the preference inconsistency, and the model provides
a tool for gauging the welfare losses from pursuing the cost-benefit rules. Some proofs
for this section are directed to the Appendix, as will be indicated.
Consider a sequence of periods t ∈ {1, 2, ...} where gradual public investments, de-
noted by qt ≥ 0, are made to build up a public-asset, denoted by st ≥ 0. The public
asset accumulates as a function of the existing stock st and current investment qt+1 ≥ 0
in the next-period asset:
st+1 = ϕ(st, qt+1),
where we assume that ϕ(.) is increasing, bounded, and twice continuously differentiable
in its arguments. This formulation is general enough to allow for multiple interpretations.
In climate change, st can measure the reduction of the greenhouse-gas stock from a pre-
determined level, and qt+1 is the current abatement effort. Variable st could also be an
index for biodiversity which is maintained by continual effort. The model could also be
interepreted as a stylized model of education where the future human capital depends
not only on past investments but also on past levels of human capital, or we can think
of st as public infrastructure where the final service depends on the quality of current
infrastructure determined by past investments.
We make the same assumptions on utility and production functions as in the three-
period model, except that we impose stationarity by assuming that the neoclassical
production technology does not change over time. The budget accounting equations
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between the periods are then
ct + kt+1 + qt+1 = f(kt) (33)
st+1 = ϕ(st, qt+1). (34)
In each period, the representative consumer makes the consumption and investment deci-
sions, and derives utility from its own consumption and the public good. The consumer’s
welfare is
wt = u(ct) + v(st) + ρ
∑∞
τ=t+1
θτ−t−1[uτ (cτ ) + vτ (sτ )], (35)
where we identify dynamically consistent preferences by ρ = θ, so that each future period
τ > t is discounted with the same discount factor θτ−t. The dynamically inconsistent
preferences are identified by ρ 6= θ, and this model lends itself to the interpretations
suggested by Phelps and Pollak (1968), Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005), and Laibson
(1997).11 In particular, ρ < θ is consistent with pure altruism towards later decision
makers, or with near-term self-control problems.12 We also allow for ρ > θ.13
Analogously to the three periods model, we can consider the utility and welfare
weights implied by an equilibrium allocation (c,q,k) = {ct, qt, kt}∞t=1. We consider the
welfare aggregator
W (c,q,k) =
∑∞
t=1
αtwt
When the mass of weights is bounded,
∑∞
t=1 αt <∞, and welfare W (c,q,k) is maximized
subject to the resource constraints of the economy, the allocation is Pareto efficient. As
in the three periods, W (c,q,k) is not an independent welfare objective but rather an
11If we wish to reformulate the preferences consistent with the β, δ model of Phelps-Pollak (1968) and
Laibson (1997): define β = ρ/θ, δ = θ and indentify inconsistent prefrences by β < 1 to obtain their
framework. We want to indentify inconsistencies by ρ 6= θ to maintain an easy comparison with the
three period model. Our framework also allows for the inverse of quasi-hyperbolic, e.g. ’linear’ time
preferences, with ρ > 0, θ = 0, where the current generation cares about the immediate future, but not
about those in the future further away.
12Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) and also Weitzman (2000) show that the aggregation of unequal time
preferences over consumers creates non-constant discount factors on the aggregate level. However, as
such, this is not a source of inconsistency for preferences as long as the underlying individual preferences
are consistent. In our case, the representative agent is the only agent capable of making the public-good
decision, and the preferences under which these decisions are made are inconsistent by assumption. We
do not explicitly model the source of the inconsistency in the public decision making.
13The models of self-control typically focus on hyperbolic preferences due to the empirical and exper-
imental support for the case (see Della Vigna 2009). We do not want to rule out the opposite of the
hyperbolic case in the context of government decision making.
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auxiliary function to connect efficient equilibrium with weights implied by the welfare
program. Similarly, we define the utility aggregator
U(c,q,k) =
∑∞
t=1
α′t[u(ct) + v(st)].
When the mass of weights is bounded,
∑∞
t=1 α
′
t <∞, and welfare U(c,q,k) is maximized
subject to the resource constraints of the economy, the allocation is u-PE. Again, any
allocation that maximizes W (c,q,k) will also be u-PE, as we can choose α′1 = α1 and
α′τ =
∑τ
t=1 αtρθ
τ−t−1 for τ > 1,and obtain the equivalence of objectives W (c,q,k) =
U(c,q,k). But the converse is not true: the equilibrium utility weights need not imply
positive welfare weights. Below, we solve the equilibrium with and without the cost-
benefit rule, and characterize the Pareto efficiency by investigating whether the implied
utility and welfare weights are positive.
Before describing the equilibrium, consider first the efficient benchmark, i.e., an allo-
cation (c,q,k) that maximizes W (c,q,k) and also U(c,q,k) for some positive respective
weights. It is easier to work with utility weights, so let us use the utility weights α′t as-
sociated with the Pareto efficient allocation in the analysis. Capital investment kt+1 > 0
satisfies
α′tu
′
t = α
′
t+1u
′
t+1f
′
t+1. (36)
This conditions holds between any two periods with positive investment, implying that
for any τ ≥ t+ 1
α′tu
′
t = α
′
τu
′
τRt,τ , (37)
where Rt,τ = f
′
t+1 · f ′t+2 · ... · f ′τ is the compound rate of return for k. On the other hand,
investment qt+1 > 0 in the public asset satisfies
α′tu
′
t =
[
α′t+1Jt+1,t+1v
′
t+1 + α
′
t+2Jt+1,t+2v
′
t+2 + ...
]
ϕq,t+1, (38)
where we use the short-hand notation ϕq,t+1 = ϕq(st, qt+1) and ϕs,t+1 = ϕs(st, qt+1), and
also Jt+1,τ = ϕs,t+1 · ϕs,t+2 · ... · ϕs,τ for the compound rate of return for the public asset
(Jt+1,t+1 ≡ 1). Rearrange (36) to obtain
1 = ϕq,t+1[
α′t+1Jt+1,t+1v
′
t+1
α′tu′t
+
α′t+2Jt+1,t+2v
′
t+2
α′tu′t
+ ...].
The expression on the right gives the benefit-cost ratio for a marginal increase in the
public asset. The benefit from the investment q is the increase in the next period public
asset stock ϕq,t+1 times the sum of the utility-weighted compound returns Jt+1,τv
′
τ in
periods τ ≥ t+ 1. The cost of the investment is the current utility loss which equals the
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return on capital investment k. To obtain an expression that does not depend on utility
weights, we can replace α′tu
′
t with (37) to obtain
1 =
[
ϕq,t+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
Jt+1,τ
Rt,τ
v′τ
u′τ
]−1
. (39)
As in three periods (cf. equation (15)), the cost-benefit rule depends only on marginal-
rates of substitutions and returns but not directly on utility weights (the inverse is taken
to maintain the expression as cost-benefit rather than benefit-cost ratio).
The final remark on the efficiency concepts is the one that connects above cost-
benefit rule and utility Pareto efficiency. The following extension of Lemma 1 to the
infinite horizon is helpful as it implies that if an equilibrium allocation deviates from the
cost-benefit rule, efficiency of neither type can be reached whatever the inconsistencies
in the underlying preference structure:
Lemma 3 Assume that for given allocation (c,q,k), the utility weight sequence con-
structed from (36) has a bounded mass,
∑∞
t=1 α
′
t < ∞. Then, (c,q,k) is u-PE if and
only if the cost-benefit ratio (39) holds.
The proof in the Appendix exploits the bounded mass condition to show that the
cost-benefit condition, quite intuitively, rules out utility improving perturbations in the
allocation. Further on, in the equilibrium analysis we will see that all equilibrium al-
locations will satisfy the bounded mass condition. We see therefore that any efficient
equilibrium allocation must have the cost-benefit ratio equal to one. We will see also
when the equilibrium will deviate from the cost-benefit ratio, and how the cost-benefit
requirement can put the economy on the u-PE frontier but not on the true Pareto frontier
(i.e., w-PE), without additional policy measures.
3.2 Constant investment-share policies
As is well known, the equilibrium outcome of the infinite-horizon Ramsey problem under
dynamically inconsistent preferences depends on the restrictions made on the strategies
available (see Krusell et al. 2002, and Karp 2007). To obtain a comparison with the
consistent preferences case (ρ = θ), we impose differentiability and symmetry restriction
on the equilibrium strategies, i.e., each generation is assumed to use the same pair of
differentiable policy functions kt+1 = g(kt, st), and qt+1 = h(kt, st).
14 Moreover, we
14See Krusell et al. 2002 for implications of relaxing these assumptions.
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confine attention to Cobb-Douglas production functions f(kt) = Ak
α
t and ϕ(st, qt+1) =
Bsδtq
1−δ
t+1 , where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < δ < 1,
15 and assume logarithmic utilities u(ct) =
ln(ct), and v(st) = ω ln(st).Under these assumptions, we can find equilibrium strategies
where investments shares 1 > g > 0 and 1 > h > 0 are constant fractions of the current
output:
kt+1 = gf(kt) (40)
qt+1 = hf(kt). (41)
The stationarity investment shares is well-known for consistent preferences (ρ = θ) under
this specification, and we will derive such policies explicitly for inconsistent preferences
(ρ 6= θ).16 Since all policies in this paper take the form (40)-(41) irrespective of the degree
of the dynamic inconsistency in the preferences, we can state some general properties of
the policies in this class before the equilibrium analysis in Section 3.3.
Given (35), we can express the equilibrium welfare as
wt = u(ct) + v(st) + ρV (kt+1, st+1), (42)
where the (auxiliary) value function satisfies
V (kt, st) = u((1− g − h)f(kt)) + v(st) + θV (gf(kt), ϕ(st, hf(kt))).
We derive in Appendix the parametric form for the value function, applying to all equi-
libria considered in this paper:
Lemma 4 The value function implied by policies (40)-(41) has the following parametric
form
V (kt+1, st+1) = ξ ln(kt+1) +
ζ
1− δ ln(st+1) + θµ[ξ ln(g) + ζ ln(h)] + µ ln(1− g − h)
where ξ, ζ, µ > 0.
The lemma is very useful as it immediately establishes some important features of
any equilibrium with constant investment shares. Notice that g and h in the value
15We follow the custom use of α for the capital-output elasticity. When using time subscripts, the αt
refer to welfare weights while α′t refer to utility weights.
16The focus on linear strategies is motivated by the ease of comparison with the consistent preferences
case. We do not consider non-linear symmetric stationary strategies; on that, see Karp (2007). Moreover,
there could be equilibria in symmetric but non-stationary strategies.
21
function refer to the future investment shares, from period t+ 1 onwards. The variables
kt+1 and st+1 are the current investments. The lemma establishes the fact that there
is no interaction between g, h, and kt+1, st+1, so that the current optimal investments
in kt+1 and st+1 are independent of future investment shares g and h. As ln(st+1) =
δ ln(st)+(1−δ) ln(qt+1), and one unit of investment in kt+1 should yield the same marginal
value as one unit investment in qt+1, the lemma shows the current investment ratio is a
constant given by kt+1/qt+1 = ξ/ζ (see Appendix for the expressions of the parameters
ξ and ζ). This ratio is independent of the immediate time-preference parameter ρ .
Furthermore, the lemma shows that the investment shares g∗ and h∗ maximizing the
value function also satisfy g∗/h∗ = ξ/ζ. Thus, the time-inconsistent preferences thereby
maintain the optimal investment shares, but will affect the aggregate investment level as
will be seen shortly.
Using the Cobb-Douglas form, the state equations, and the stationarity of investment
shares, we can write the compound productivity variables as
Jt+1,τ = δ
τ−t−1 sτ
st+1
Rt,τ = g
t−τατ−t
kτ+1
kt+1
.
Substituting in (39), and using constant investment shares identities, we can write the
cost-benefit ratio explicitly for any (g, h) –policy that implies bounded payoffs as (we
derive this expression in the Appendix):
1 =
[
ϕq,t+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
Jt+1,τ
Rt,τ
v′τ
u′τ
]−1
=
h(α− δg)
gω(1− δ)(1− g − h) . (43)
We know from Section 3.1 that any u-PE allocation must satisfy this rule, and thus
any (g, h)–policy that is u-PE must satisfy the cost-benefit rule (43). Moreover, u-PE
allocation with constant investment shares must also satisfy (36) and thus the policy pins
down the ratio of the subsequent utility weights as follows:
γ ≡ α
′
t+1
α′t
=
u′t
u′t+1Rt,t+1
=
ct+1
ctRt,t+1
=
ct+1
ct
g
α
kt+1
kt+2
=
g
α
(44)
where the last step uses stationarity of ct/kt+1 = (1− g − h)/g.
For interpretation it is useful to note that when γ < 1 we can view the equilibrium as
if the choices were made by a representative dynastic agent facing (consistent) discount
factor γ, provided the cost-benefit rule (43) holds.17 The discount factors γt−1 are the
17We notice that if γ > 1, we have a dynamically inefficient allocation, and the capital stock converges
22
utility weights for periods t ≥ 1, and then it follows from Lemma 3 that such an allocation
is utility Pareto efficient:
Lemma 5 For an equilibrium with constant investment shares g and h, and γ in (44)
strictly less than unity, the equilibrium is u-PE if and only if the cost-benefit rule (43)
holds.
As we can take γ < 1 as the discount factor, it is clear that upon observing the
equilibrium path ex post we cannot distinguish consistent decision makers from incon-
sistent ones, i.e., the decisions could have been made by a representative agent with
time-consistent preferences.
Remark 2 An equilibrium with constant investment shares g and h that satisfies the
cost-benefit rule (43) and with γ < 1 in (44) is observationally equivalent with an alloca-
tion that follows from geometrical utility discounting.
The remark resembles the observational equivalence noticed by Barro (1999), but
deviates in an important point: in our case, there are two assets and we need additional
conditions for the observational equivalence to hold, i.e., the relative investments shares
in the two assets must satisfy the cost-benefit rule, and there is nothing as of yet that
implies the satisfaction of this rule. Below, in the equilibrium analysis, we find values for
production-side parameters α and δ such that the equivalence holds irrespective of the
time preference parameters ρ and θ. In general, as we will see and in contrast with Barro,
the time-inconsistent preferences will not result in equilibria that are observationally
equivalent to those resulting from exponentially decreasing welfare weights when there is
more than one capital good.
When observing a constant investment share equilibrium satisfying the cost-benefit
rule, the previous results imply that we have a utility efficient allocation at hand, but
how to verify true welfare efficiency? The answer turns out to be simple:
Lemma 6 The u-PE equilibrium with γ = g/α < 1 is w-PE if and only if γ ≥ max{ρ, θ}.
In the Appendix, we use the lower bound on the “equilibrium discount factor” γ, i.e.
the condition γ ≥ max{ρ, θ}, to show that the welfare weights remain positive, and also
to a level at which f ′ < 1. We can then construct a strict utility Pareto improvement by lowering the
capital stock to k∗ with f ′(k∗) = 1. For γ = 1, dynamic efficiency requires f ′(k0) > 1. But as we will
see that all equilibria satisfy γ < 1, we do not go into the details for γ ≥ 1.
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that only in this case such weights can be found. Intuitively, γ can be seen as the discount
factor that makes the first generation look like a fictional consistent-preferences planner;
when this ”planner” puts a per-period weight larger than ρ and θ on each generation’s
utility, then the implied equilibrium utility weights are large enough to leave room for
positive welfare weights. It is not obvious whether this can hold in equilibrium — in
particular so when the cost-benefit requirement is imposed as a rule of the game.
3.3 Equilibrium
Given the background from the previous section, it is now straightforward to assess the
efficiency properties of the equilibrium. Considering the symmetric equilibrium where
each period representative consumer chooses the same pair (g, h), we can readily see the
continuation value for each investment level from Lemma 4, and determine the equilib-
rium investment shares g and h from the first-order conditions for kt+1 and qt+1,
u′(ct) = ρVk(kt+1, st+1), (45)
u′(ct) = ρϕq,t+1Vs(kt+1, st+1). (46)
Given functional forms from Lemma 4, the equilibrium best-responses (45) and (46) can
be written as
kt+1 = ρξct (47)
qt+1 = ρζct. (48)
Using kt+1/qt+1 = g/h and ct/kt+1 = (1−g−h)/g together with (47)-(48), we can express
the equilibrium policies as follows (using the expressions for ξ and ζ in Appendix):
g =
ρξ
1 + ρζ + ρξ
= ρα
1− δθ + θω(1− δ)
1− δθ + ρω(1− δ) + α(1− δθ)(ρ− θ) , (49)
h =
ρζ
1 + ρζ + ρξ
= ρω
(1− αθ)(1− δ)
1− δθ + ρω(1− δ) + α(1− δθ)(ρ− θ) . (50)
We see that when preferences are time-consistent (θ = ρ), the equilibrium investment in
k has the familiar form g = αρ, and the equilibrium discount factor is, as it should, γ =
g
α
= ρ < 1. When preferences are time-inconsistent (θ 6= ρ), we can obtain the intuitive
result that the equilibrium discount factor is between the two conceivable extremes:
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Lemma 7 For all ρ 6= θ, the equilibrium policy g satisfies
min{ρ, θ} < γ = g
α
< max{ρ, θ} < 1.
The reasoning for this result (formally proved in the Appendix) is straightforward.
Suppose the long-term discount factor θ is larger than the short-term factor ρ, which
can be thought of as altruism towards later generations. Had the equilibrium discount
factor γ been larger than θ, the equilibrium savings would exceed those in the case where
the most altruistic discount factor θ is applied in each period. Savings this high cannot
occur in equilibrium, as the true discount factor is determined by the short- and long-
term discount factors jointly. Similarly, for γ lower than ρ, the savings would be lower
than those under the short-term discounting. Clearly, the equilibrium savings must be
somewhere between the extremes.
We can now describe the equilibrium outcome as depending on the inconsistency of
the preferences and the relative persistency of the public asset. For ease of exposition,
we use CBR as a shorthand for the cost-benefit ratio, expressed on the right-hand side
of the cost-benefit rule (43). We plug in the equilibrium policies (49) and (50) to (43) to
obtain:
CBR = 1 +
1− (δ − ω + ωδ)ρ− α(θ − ρ)
(δ − α− ω + ωδ)(θ − ρ) .
This is a closed form expression for the equilibrium cost-benefit ratio, implying:
Proposition 3 Returns on public investments fall short of returns on capital (CBR > 1)
in equilibrium if and only if (θ− ρ)(δ− α+ω
1+ω
) > 0. The equilibrium is u-PE if and only if
either (i) θ = ρ, or (ii) δ = α+ω
1+ω
.
The proof (in the Appendix) is a matter of straightforward verification. The latter
part follows by the equivalence of the utility Pareto efficiency and the cost-benefit rule
(CBR = 1) that we explicated in lemma 3. While the equilibrium deviation from the
cost-benefit rule is not surprising given our arguments from three periods, the result gives
more structure to the determinants of the deviation. In particular, since commitment
provided by the public asset depends on its persistence relative to the traditional capital,
the degree of over- or under-investment depends not only on preferences but also on
persistence. A large long-term discount factor (θ > ρ) was previously shown to be a
reason for over-investment (i.e., costs exceeding benefits, CBR > 1), but now the public
asset should also be persistent enough to satisfy δ > α+ω
1+ω
. Otherwise, the agent will
under-invest in the public asset.
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When preferences are time-consistent (θ = ρ), the cost-benefit rule will hold and the
equilibrium is, of course, u-PE. But this outcome also arises when the persistence of the
public asset exactly matches the persistence of welfare transferred to future generations
through capital (δ = α+ω
1+ω
), i.e., the equilibrium will be u-PE irrespective of the structure
of time preferences (ρ = θ, and ρ 6= θ). This result sheds light on the generality of
the observational equivalence between the equilibrium outcome and that obtained under
consistent preferences, pointed out by Barro (1999) and discussed in Remark 2. With
more than one capital good, the observational equivalence follows only in the knife-edge
case identified here.
The observational equivalence does not imply welfare efficiency, however. Lemma 7
implies that the exponential decrease in utility weights γ associated with the equilibrium
is too large.
Proposition 4 Suppose preferences are inconsistent, θ 6= ρ, but δ = α+ω
1+ω
so that the
equilibrium is u-PE. The equilibrium is not w-PE.
Efficiency requires γ ≥ max{ρ, θ} but this contradicts Lemma 7 above. The result
thus implies that the equilibrium can never reach w-PE when preferences are dynami-
cally inconsistent. This result is not surprising; while the equilibrium satisfies temporal
efficiency in the sense that the composition of savings is optimal, the overall savings
still deviate from the efficient savings for the reasons known from the one capital-good
Ramsey saving problems with hyperbolic preferences.
3.4 Cost-benefit law equilibrium
We explore now whether the cost-benefit law, similar to that studied in three-periods,
can improve welfare. We assume that the cost-benefit requirement is an institutional
constraint dictating that all public investments must earn the same return as capital
investments. As in three periods, we may think that the requirement is implemented
administratively, e.g., through a budget office scrutinizing the investment plan at the
end of each period. Other than this per-period check on the composition of spending,
each generation is free to choose, within the resource constraints, the overall level of
investment and consumption. With infinite horizon, the welfare implications of the cost-
benefit law are less obvious than in three periods, as the current generation can potentially
benefit from the future generation’s adherence to the law — in three periods we could
not address the full dynamic potential of the cost-benefit law, as it was only binding for
the first generation by construction.
26
Formally, we consider a game where each generation chooses investments kt+1 and qt+1
subject to the constraint that the cost-benefit ratio must equal unity (CBR = 1), and
the restriction on strategies that each future generation applies a constant investment
share policy. We can think of each period involving two steps. In the first, the agent
decides only on the overall investment It+1 = kt+1 + qt+1 and, in the second, the amount
It+1 is divided between the two purposes such that CBR = 1 is satisfied, understanding
that each future generation will follow the same procedure.
Since we are focusing on the constant investment share policies, and the cost-benefit
rule (43) was derived for any such policy, we can solve for the investment shares from
the cost-benefit rule (43):18
qt+1
kt+1
=
ω(1− δ)(1− g − h)
α− δg ≡
η
1− η .
The left-hand side refers to current investment decisions, and the right hand side refers to
future investment decisions that are considered as given by the future agents’ strategies
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. By definition, η is the share of the public asset
investment in total investments It+1. Given the future policies, we only need to consider
the best-response today for total savings It+1, as the shares follow by kt+1 = (1− η)It+1,
and qt+1 = ηIt+1. We must thus have
dwt
dIt+1
= −dut
dct
+ ρ((1− η)dVt+1
dkt+1
+ η
dVt+1
dqt+1
) = 0 (51)
We have derived the form for the value function for any pair of (g, h)-policies, so we can
readily assess the implications of the cost-benefit rule on total savings:
Remark 3 The cost-benefit law does not change total investments, but only the shares
of capital and the public good. Investment in the public good decreases if and only if
(θ − ρ)(δ − α+ω
1+ω
) > 0
Formally, we can see the first part of the result from the first-order condition (51)
which, given Lemma 4, can be restated as
It+1 = ρ(ξ + ζ)ct (52)
By It+1 =
g+h
1−g−hct,
g + h =
ρξ + ρζ
1 + ρζ + ρξ
.
18This follows by rearranging equation (58) in Appendix where we derive the closed form for the
cost-benefit rule.
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which equals the equilibrium total savings implied by (49) and (50). This result is already
indicative of the fact that the cost-benefit requirement alone cannot deliver a Pareto
efficient outcome (w-PE), as it does not correct for the distortions in overall savings.
For the second part, note that in this equilibrium we must have CBR = 1 so that, if
CBR > 1, the public-asset investment share declines when compared to the equilibrium
without the cost-benefit rule.19 Thus, the cost-benefit law either pulls resources away
from public investment or towards it, depending on the relative persistence of the public
asset and preference inconsistencies as indicated by the condition in the Proposition (that
we discussed in the previous section).
The cost-benefit law restores productive efficiency in the sense that all assets earn
seemingly appropriate returns, so that by observing such an outcome we might conclude
that efficiency has been achieved. However, in levels the outcome is inefficient due to the
fact that there are distortions in savings, when preferences are inconsistent:
Proposition 5 If ρ 6= θ, the cost-benefit law equilibrium is not w-PE.
We can verify the result by noting that the law implements an equilibrium that is
observationally equivalent to a consistent-preferences equilibrium with discount factor
γ < 1; see our Remark 2. Such a fictional consistent-preferences economy grows by
investing fraction g = αγ of the output in capital k. In the true equilibrium, the first-
order condition for capital investment implies a constant investment-consumption ratio:
kt+1
ct
= ρα[
1
(1− αθ) +
(1− δ)ωθ
(1− αθ)(1− δθ) ].
Since observationally equivalent consistent-preferences equilibrium must satisfy the same
ratio, we have
ρα[
1
(1− αθ) +
(1− δ)ωθ
(1− αθ)(1− δθ) ] = γα[
1
(1− αγ) +
(1− δ)ωγ
(1− αγ)(1− δγ) ],
where the right-hand side is the consistent-preferences version of the ratio. However, if
γ ≥ max{ρ, θ}, the equation cannot hold (the right-hand side is larger). Thus, we must
have γ < max{ρ, θ}, and by Lemma 6, full efficiency (w-PE) is not achieved.The con-
struction of γ immediately provides observational equivalence between various economies,
as in Barro (1999):
19The cost-benefit ratio in (43) strictly decreases in h when g + h remains constant, as is the case in
this comparison.
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Corollary 3 The inefficient cost-benefit law equilibrium is observationally equivalent to
an efficient equilibrium resulting from time-consistent preferences with discount factors
ρ˜ = θ˜ = γ, where min{ρ, θ} < γ < max{ρ, θ}.
In analogy to the three-period model, the corollary shows a difficulty if one wishes to
check efficiency ex-post. Recall that from Lemmas 5 and 6 it immediately follows that the
cost-benefit rule in combination with a requirement for sufficiently large overall savings,
to guarantee g ≥ αmax{ρ, θ}, establishes welfare efficiency. However, if the cost-benefit
rule is imposed, the preference structure as defined by ρ and θ cannot be deduced from
equilibrium, and the condition g ≥ αmax{ρ, θ} cannot be checked.
To illustrate, suppose ρ > θ so that the decision maker is hyperbolic, and thus
the equilibrium total savings fall short of the efficient savings; the agent would like to
save more but cannot do so due to self-control problems, under this interpretation of the
dynamic consistency. Now, with the cost-benefit requirement, the agent is still hyperbolic
and the distortions in savings remain, as shown by the result that the savings are not
changed but only their composition.
While the cost-benefit law does not restore full efficiency, it might be argued that the
productive inefficiency removed produces at least a Pareto improvement. However, not
even this can be achieved:
Proposition 6 The implementation of the cost-benefit law from period t onwards implies
a welfare loss for generation t, compared to the equilibrium without the law.
The result shows that the three period conclusion extends to infinite horizon: the first
generation under the law cannot sufficiently benefit from the later generations’ adherence
to the law. In this sense, the cost-benefit rule does noy create overall economic surplus
that could be used to justify more complicated behavioral strategies supporting the rule
as an equilibrium outcome without imposing it as an institutional constraint.
For the proof of the result, recall that the cost-benefit law does not change the total
savings, but only the composition. We will first establish that for given total savings
in the benchmark SPE without the cost-benefit requirement the composition of savings
maximizes the continuation welfare given by value function Vt, so that the cost-benefit
law must strictly decrease the value of future welfare to the current generation. From
Lemma 4, it is clear that the pair (g, h) maximizing V given g+h = I for some exogenous
I must satisfy g/h = ξ/ζ. As this ratio is preserved in the benchmark SPE, labeled with
BAU, we thus have
V (kt+1, st+1; g
CBR, hCBR) < V (kt+1, st+1; g
BAU , hBAU)
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if gCBR 6= gBAU , where CBR and BAU refer to policies in the two cases. We can then
conclude that
wCBRt = u
CBR
t + v
CBR
t + ρV (k
CBR
t+1 , s
CBR
t+1 ; g
CBR, hCBR)
< uCBRt + v
CBR
t + ρV (k
CBR
t+1 , s
CBR
t+1 ; g
BAU , hBAU)
< uBAUt + v
BAU
t + ρV (k
BAU
t+1 , s
BAU
t+1 ; g
BAU , hBAU)
= wBAUt
The second inequality follows from the fact that welfare without constraints on invest-
ments, as in the benchmark SPE, must exceed welfare with additional constraints.
To prepare the ground for the illustration, we conclude this section by studying the
effect of the cost-benefit requirement on the steady-state welfare. Let us denote log-
variables by tildes and write the steady state stocks as
k˜∗ =
g˜
1− α
s˜∗ = h˜+
α
1− αg˜.
Substituting, we can write the steady-state utility level as
u∗ + v∗ =
α(1 + ω)
1− α g˜ + ωh˜+ ln(1− g − h),
and consider the investment shares that maximize steady state utility and welfare:
g∗
h∗
=
α
1− α
1 + ω
ω
.
Proposition 7 The cost-benefit law decreases the steady state welfare if preferences are
hyperbolic (θ > ρ)
Let us use δ∗ = α+ω
1+ω
for the critical persistence of the public asset. Comparing the
ratio in investments between the benchmark SPE without the cost-benefit rule, denoted
by BAU , and the steady state optimum, we get
gBAU
hBAU
h∗
g∗
=
ξ
ζ
1− α
α
ω
1 + ω
=
1− αθ − (δ − δ∗)θ(1 + ω)
1− αθ
1− α
1− α− (δ − δ∗)(1 + ω) ,
where ratio ξ/ζ is obtained from the Appendix for the value function. When δ = δ∗, the
ratio equals one. This is the case where imposing the cost-benefit rule has no bite since
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rule is satisfied anyways; the equilibrium is u-PE as the persistence of the public asset
happens to match the persistence of the other asset. When δ > δ∗, the first ratio decreases
relatively less as 1 − αθ > 1 − α and θ < 1, so that the overall ratio exceeds one. In
the benchmark SPE there is thus too much investment in the neoclassical capital. If the
public good is persistent (δ > α+ω
1+ω
) and preferences are hyperbolic, the cost-benefit law
will further increase investments in the capital stock, at the cost of the public good, and
steady state utility must decrease. If the public good is fluid (δ < α+ω
1+ω
) and preferences
are hyperbolic, the cost-benefit law will decrease investments in the capital stock, and
increase the public good, but the above ratio is below one and steady state utility still
decreases.
3.5 Illustration
As seen from the above steady-state analysis, the cost-benefit law can pull investments
from the public good into capital, and this may go at the cost of long-term utility. To see
whether ballpark numbers can make this effect visible, we carry out a simple exercise.
Consider the case where one must choose between investments in capital or in a very
durable public asset such as the global environmental quality. Say time steps are 20
years so that we may treat the neoclassical capital as a broad man-made stock that is
fully depreciated in one period, and a = 0.5. For the public asset, we consider the global
environment, such as the climate, involving extremely slow global processes; e.g., the
uptake of antropogenic emissions can imply that atmospheric CO2 particles depreciate
annually 0.5 per cent. This implies δ = 0.9. Let us assume that agents are relatively
impatient in the short term discounting at annual rate of 2.5 per cent, implying ρ = 0.5,
but do not differentiate much after the first 20 years; we set θ = 0.95. These parameters
would lead to a gross investment rate in capital of g = 0.329. By choosing the weight
given to the public good as ω = 0.1, we determine the optimal investment in the public
good as h = 0.022. An interpretation could be that in the benchmark equilibrium 2.2
per cent of income is used to preserve the environment, e.g. to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. However, the net present value of benefits of public investments is less then
half of the immediate costs, suggesting a potential welfare improvement by implementing
the cost benefit rule.
If we implement the cost-benefit rule, part of the resources invested in the public
asset are diverted to the capital stock. The optimal investment in capital increases while
investments in the public good would about halve, h = 0.011. The long-term capital
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stock increases by almost 7 per cent, consumption increases by about 3 per cent, but
weighted utility from the public good decreases by an amount equivalent to a decrease
in consumption of the private good of about 6 per cent. Enforcing the cost benefit rule
decreases substantially overall long-term welfare by as much as would be caused by a
drop in capital of 7 per cent.
parameter variable Benchmark Equilibrium Cost-benefit law
α 0.5 g 0.329 0.340
ω 0.1 h 0.022 0.011
δ 0.9 k∗ 1 1.068
ρ 0.5 s∗ 1 0.525
θ 0.95 u∗ 0 0.033
v∗ 0 −0.064
CBR 2.136 1
4 Concluding remarks
Public investments are often extremely long term by nature. Due to the long time
horizon and difficulties in evaluating the future benefits, they present a challenge to the
traditional cost-benefit analysis. We introduced a different complication: if preferences
are known to change in the future such that the future ranking of current public decisions
will be different from that today, how should the principles of the CBA be altered? We
found that the persistence of the effects of current decisions lead to incentives to deviate
from the standard cost-benefit requirements. Almost by definition the public investments
provide commitment to current preferences, and it makes sense to use this commitment
to overcome the inconsistencies in public decision making over time.
We found no normative reason to insist on the use cost-benefit rules when preferences
are inconsistent: the overall welfare is not maximized under such rules. The cost-benefit
analysis is based on a narrow concept of efficiency, and imposing the cost-benefit rule does
not even imply a Pareto improvement, let alone achievement of welfare Pareto efficiency.
One extension of the current infinite-horizon model is a more detailed application to
climate change, e.g., by using a numerical integrated assessment model (IAM) linking the
economy and the climate development. Based on our results on observational equivalence
between consistent and inconsistent preferences equilibria, we can conjecture that a stan-
dard IAM solution can also be interpreted as an equilibrium resulting from inconsistent
preferences with an enforced cost-benefit rule. One can then explore with little effort
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the welfare loss from pursuing the cost-benefit rules (typically justified by a consistent
preference framework) if the true underlying preferences are in fact inconsistent.
On a theory level, a natural alternative formulation is one where the current govern-
ment understands that the future preferences are likely to be different but is unsure in
which way. Alternatively, one may want to consider more deeply the source of incon-
sistency in public decision making. For example, it is well known that aggregation over
individual heterogenous discount factors leads to average discount rates that decline with
the time horizon (Weitzman 2000, Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005). As such this is not a
source inconsistency in decentralized economy with heterogenous but consistent agents
(Lengwiler 2005). However, in public decision making one may be forced to aggregate
over individuals such that inconsistencies arise. We leave these interesting questions open
for future research.
Appendix: Lemma 3
The if-part of the lemma is straightforward. Once the utility weights are constructed,
if first order conditions are satisfied, the allocation must be u-PE. Consider then the
only-if -part, and optimal utility sequence {u∗t + v∗t }t≥1 that maximizes U(c,q,k). Strict
concavity of utility and production functions means that for any non-zero {∆t}∞t=1 with∑∞
t=1 α
′
t∆t ≥ 0, {u∗t + v∗t + ∆t}t≥1 is infeasible as utility sequence. For
∑∞
t=1 α
′
t∆t < 0,
there is a ε > 0 such that u∗+v∗+ε∆ is feasible as utility vector. We notice that the first
order condition for kt+1 defines the (direction of) perturbations dct, dct+1, dkt+1 that are
consistent with perturbations in utility pairs (dut, dut+1) such that α
′
tdut+α
′
t+1dut+1 = 0.
That is, if we have a ∆t with
∑∞
t=1 α
′
t∆t < 0, then we can construct a sequence of
perturbations dct, dkt+1 such that the associated change in utility satisfies dut ≥ ε∆t.
If the first-order condition for qt is not met, then there is a feasible perturbation
dqt, (dsτ )
∞
τ=t+1 such that the resulting dut, (dvτ )
∞
τ=t+1 satisfies α
′
tdut +
∑∞
τ=t+1 α
′
τdvτ > 0.
Now take ∆t = −dut, and ∆τ = −dvτ , and we thus construct a perturbation dct, dkt+1
such that the associated change in utility satisfies duτ ≥ ε∆τ for τ = t, ...,∞. If we
now add ε times the perturbation in qt, (sτ )
∞
τ=t+1, we have a feasible perturbation that
substitutes capital for public investment, or other way around, and that strictly increases
the utility path.
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Appendix: expression (43)
We obtain by expanding,
ϕq,t+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
Jt+1,τ
Rt,τ
v′τ
u′τ
= (1− δ)st+1
qt+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1 sτ
st+1
gt−τατ−t kτ+1
kt+1
ωcτ
sτ
(53)
= (1− δ)st+1
qt+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1 sτ
st+1
gt−τατ−t kτ+1
kt+1
(1− g − h)ωkτ+1
gsτ
(54)
= (1− δ)st+1
qt+1
∑∞
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1
gt−τατ−t
(1− g − h)ωkt+1
gst+1
(55)
=
gt
ht
ω(1− δ)(1− g − h)
∑∞
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1gτ−t
ατ−t
(56)
=
gt
ht
ω(1− δ)(1− g − h)
α
∑∞
τ=0
(
δg
α
)τ (57)
=
gt
ht
ω(1− δ)(1− g − h)
(α− δg) . (58)
Line (53) follows from the definition of ϕq,t+1 and the state equation for st+1 together
with expressions for compound returns from the main text. Line (54) uses gcτ = (1 −
g − h)kτ+1. Line (55) follows by simplification. Line (56) uses kt+1/st+1 = g/h. Line
(58) uses the boundedness assumption. We used the subscript t for the investment shares
when they refer to current investment decisions as opposed to future investment shares
that are given from the present point of view.
Appendix: Lemma 6
The equilibrium implies geometric utility weights α′t = γ
t−1. If γ < ρ or γ < θ one cannot
construct a sequence of non-negative welfare weights αt consistent with the sequence of
utility weights α′t. Suppose the contrary, that welfare weights αt ≥ 0 consistent with α′t
exist. Then, using the definition of w-PE, we see that for some τ > t, the relationship
between the two is α′1 = α1 and α
′
τ =
∑τ
t=1 αtρθ
τ−t−1 for τ > 1. Expanding the latter
gives
α′τ = α1ρθ
τ−2 + α2ρθ
τ−3 + ...+ ατ−1ρ+ ατ . (59)
If γ < θ and α1 > 0, we see that the equation cannot hold with ατ ≥ 0 for sufficiently
large τ . If γ < ρ, we can write from (59)
α′τ+1 ≥ ρατ + ατ+1,
or
γα′τ − ρατ ≥ ατ+1.
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Again, since γ < ρ, this cannot hold with ατ+1 ≥ 0 for sufficiently large τ .
Consider now γ ≥ max{ρ, θ}. We show that now one can construct the non-negative
welfare weights. We construct an algorithm for finding the weights. Let α˜1 = {α1τ}τ≥1,
α˜2 = {α2τ}τ≥2, and so on. Define
α1τ = γ
τ−1, τ ≥ 1
α2τ = α
1
τ − α11θτ−t−1, τ ≥ 2
...
αt+1τ = α
t
τ − αttθτ−t−1, τ ≥ t.
The value of αtτ measures the weight remaining for generation τ after all altruistic weights
of generations 1 to t− 1 have been subtracted. Note that the equilibrium implies utility
weights α˜1, and {αtt}t≥1 is the sequence of welfare weights consistent with α˜1. The main
intermediate result that we need, in order to prove that the sequence of welfare weights
{αtt}t≥1 is non-negative, is that for all τ ≥ t :
αtτ+1
αtτ
> max{ρ, θ}. (60)
By construction, this condition is satisfied for t = 1. It implies that next sequence α˜2,
induced by the algorithm, is non-negative, as
α2τ = γ
τ−1 − θτ−t−1 > α1τ{(max{ρ, θ})τ−1 − ρθτ−t−1} > 0, τ ≥ 2.
By induction, if the condition holds for α˜t, the sequence α˜t+1 is non-negative:
αt+1τ > α
t
τ{(max{ρ, θ})τ−t − ρθτ−t−1} > 0, τ ≥ t.
Thus, we are done if we can show that condition (60) holds. Notice that
αt+1τ+1 = α
t
τ+1 − αttρθτ−t > max{ρ, θ}αtτ − αttρθτ−t ≥ θ{αtτ − αttρθτ−t−1} = θ{αt+1τ }.
If θ > ρ, this proves that αt+1τ+1 > θ{αt+1τ } > ρ{αt+1τ }. On the other hand, if θ < ρ, we
have
αt+1τ+1 = α
t
τ+1 − αttρθτ−t > max{ρ, θ}αtτ − αttρθτ−t ≥ ρ{αtτ − αttρθτ−t−1} = ρ{αt+1τ },
which completes the proof.
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Appendix: deriving the value function
Proof of Lemma 4. We proceed in the following steps. First, we show that there are
parameters ξ, ζ, ag, ah, µ such that the value function can be written as
Vt = ξ ln(kt) +
ζ
1− δ ln(st) + ag ln(g) + ah ln(h) + µ ln(1− g − h).
Then we analyze how ag and ah relate to the other parameters.
Given stationary investment shares, we can fully calculate all forward capital and
public good levels. We use tildes to denote log-variables. The stock dynamics can then
be written recursively as
k˜t+1 = g˜ + αk˜t (61)
s˜t+1 = δs˜t + (1− δ)(h˜+ αk˜t) (62)
Substitution allows us to find the complete future path of stocks kt and st as a function
of initial stocks k1 and s1, and the policy functions:
k˜t+1 = α
tk˜1 +
1− αt
1− α g˜ (63)
s˜t+1 = δ
ts˜1 + (1− δt)h˜+ (1− δ)αk˜1
∑t−1
τ=0 α
τδt−τ−1 + (1− δ)αg˜∑t−1τ=1 1− ατ1− α δt−τ−1(64)
= δts˜1 + (1− δt)h˜+ (1− δ)αδ
t − αt
δ − α k˜1 +
α(1− δ)
1− α (
1
1− δ −
δt − αt
δ − α )g˜ (65)
First, we observe that using logarithms denoted by a tilde, we have ut = c˜t = ln(1− g −
h) + αk˜t, vt = ωs˜t, and by definition
Vt =
∑∞
τ=0 θ
τ (ut+τ + vt+τ )
=
1
1− θ ln(1− g − h) + α
∑∞
τ=0 θ
τ k˜t+τ + ω
∑∞
τ=0 θ
τ s˜t+τ
If we have a look at (63) and (64), the general parametric form is obvious. For the
parameters, we find
where
ξ = ρα
1 + ωθ − δθ − ωδθ
(1− αθ)(1− δθ) ,
ζ = ρ
(1− δ)ω
(1− δθ) .
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ξ = α
∑∞
τ=0(θα)
τ + α(1− δ)ω∑∞τ=0(αθ/δ)τ
=
α
1− αθ +
(1− δ)θω
(1− αθ)(1− δθ)
= α
1 + ωθ − δθ − ωδθ
(1− αθ)(1− δθ)
ζ = (1− δ)ω∑∞τ=0(δθ)τ
=
(1− δ)ω
(1− δθ)
µ =
1
1− θ
We now want to determine ag and ah. As above, we could directly calculate the coeffi-
cients by summing all terms over time, but we can also derive the coefficients by a more
subtle reasoning. For time consistent preferences, ρ = θ, we can calculate the investment
shares g∗ = kt+1/yt and h∗ = qt+1/yt that maximize
wt = ut(yt − kt+1 − qt+1) + θV (kt+1, st+1; g, h)
which gives
g∗ =
θξ
1 + θξ + θζ
h∗ =
θζ
1 + θξ + θζ
These values must be the same as those we can calculate directly from maximizing V :
g∗ =
ag
µ+ ag + ah
h∗ =
ah
µ+ ag + ah
It follows directly that ag = µθξ and ah = µθζ. Q.E.D.
Appendix: Lemma 7
We will show that ρ < θ gives ρ < g/α < θ, while θ < ρ results in θ < g/α < ρ. First
compare g/α in (49) with ρ:
g/α < ρ⇔
0 < [α(1− δθ) + ω(1− δ)](ρ− θ)⇔
θ < ρ
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The second equivalence follows because all terms between the square brackets are positive.
It follows that ρ < θ gives ρ < g/α, while θ < ρ results in g/α < ρ. Now compare g/α
and θ:
g/α < θ ⇔
ρ[1− δθ + θω(1− δ)] < θ[1− δθ + ρω(1− δ) + α(1− δθ)(ρ− θ)]⇔
0 < (αθ − 1)(1− δθ)(ρ− θ)⇔
ρ < θ
The last equivalence follows because the first term between brackets is negative while the
second is positive. This shows the second half of the lemma: ρ < θ gives υ < θ, while
θ < ρ results in θ < υ.
Appendix: Proposition 3
We can now plug in the equilibrium policies to the cost-benefit ratio in (43):
CBR = 1 +
1− (δ − ω + ωδ)ρ− α(θ − ρ)
(δ − α− ω + ωδ)(θ − ρ) .
The numerator of the fraction is positive,
1− (δ − (1− δ)ω)ρ− α(θ − ρ) > 1− ρ− α(θ − ρ)
= 1− (1− α)ρ− αθ > 0.
The first part of the proposition follows immediately from the comparison of the denom-
inator with (θ− ρ)(δ− α+ω
1+ω
). For the second statement, Lemma 7 implies that the utility
weight γ associated with the equilibrium is below unity. From Lemma 5 we can see that
γ < 1 together with CBR = 1 implies utility Pareto efficiency.
References
[1] Adler M.D., and E.A. Posner (2006), New Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[2] Arrow,Kenneth J., Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester
B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V.
Kerry Smith, and Robert N. Stavins, Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Environmental, Health, and Safety Analysis?, Science, 12 April 1996, Volume 272,
pp. 221-222.
38
[3] Barro R.J. (1999), Ramsey meets Laibson in the neoclassical growth model, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 114: 1125-1152.
[4] Bassetto, M., and T.J. Sargent (2006), Politics and efficiency of separating capital
and ordinary government budgets, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.121 n.4,
pp.1167-1210.
[5] Bernheim, D.B., and A. Rangel (2009), Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-
Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 51-104.
[6] Caplin A, and Leahy J (2004), The social discount rate, Journal of Political Economy
112: 1257-1268.
[7] DellaVigna, S. (2009), Psychology and Economics: Evidence from The Field, Journal
of Economic Literature, Vol. 47, pp. 315-372.
[8] Fiva, J. H. and G. J. Natvik (2010), ‘Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public
Investment?’, working paper, May 2010.
[9] Glazer, A. (1989), Politics and the Choice of Durability, American Economic Review,
79(5), 1207-1213.
[10] Gollier, C., Discounting an uncertain future (2002), Journal of Public Economics,
85 (2), pp. 149-166
[11] Gollier, C., and R. Zeckhauser (2005), Aggregation of Heterogeneous Time Prefer-
ences, Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol. 113, issue 4, ppp. 878-896.
[12] Karp L. (2005), Global warming and hyperbolic discounting, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 89: 261-282.
[13] Karp L. (2007), Non-constant discounting in continuous time, Journal of Economic
Theory 132: 557-568.
[14] Krusell P., Kuruscu B, Smith A.A. (2002), Equilibrium welfare and government
policy with quasi-geometric discounting, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 42-72.
[15] Laibson D. (1997), Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112: 443-477.
39
[16] Lengwiler, Y. (2005), Heterogeneous Patience and the Term Structure of Real In-
terest Rates, The American Economic Review, 95(3), pp. 890-896.
[17] Lind R.C. (1995), Intergenerational equity, discounting, and the role of cost-benefit
analysis in evaluating global climate policy, Energy Policy 23(4-5): 379-389.
[18] Nordhaus, W. D.(2007), A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3), 686-702.
[19] O’Donoghue, T., and M. Rabin (1999), Doing It Now or Later, The American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 103-124
[20] Phelps E.S. and R.A. Pollak (1968), On second-best national saving and game-
equilibrium growth, Review of Economic Studies 35(2): 185-199.
[21] Persson, T., and L. E. O. Svensson (1989), Why a Stubborn Conservative would
Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 325-345.
[22] Saez-Marti M. and J.W. Weibull (2005), Discounting and altruism to future decision
makers, Journal of Economic Theory 122: 254-266
[23] Stern, N. (2006), ”The economics of climate change: the Stern review”, Cambridge,
UK: Cambride University Press.
[24] Strotz, R. H. (1956), Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,
The Review of Economic Studies, 23(3), pp. 165-180.
[25] Tabellini, G, and A. Alesina (1990), Voting on the Budget Deficit, The American
Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 37-49.
[26] Weitzman, M. (2000), Gamma Discounting, The American Economic Review, 91(1),
260-271.
[27] Weitzman, M. (2007). A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3), 703-724.
40
